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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
LETHRON D. TATE, : Case No. 981793-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Given the state's concession that (1) the revocation was 
based solely on hearsay, (2) the judge did not make a finding of 
good cause, and (3) nothing in the record supports good cause, 
the only issue for this Court is whether the order revoking 
probation should be vacated. Controlling case law from Utah 
appellate courts requires that the order revoking probation be 
vacated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE AT 
THE PROBATION REVOCATION HEARING REQUIRES THAT THE 
ORDER REVOKING PROBATION BE VACATED. 
The state concedes that the revocation in this case was 
based solely on hearsay, and that the trial judge did not make a 
finding that good cause justified the use of hearsay. State's 
brief ("S.B.") at 5-6. The state further concedes that nothing 
in the record supports a finding that good cause existed which 
justified the use of the hearsay evidence. S.B. at 5-6. 
Despite these concessions, the state insists that it ought 
to be given a second bite of the apple, asking that this Court 
remand the matter "to the trial court for findings as to the 
existence of good cause for the use of hearsay evidence, or to 
allow defendant to cross-examine the witnesses upon which the 
State relies." S.B. at 9. The state apparently bases its claim 
regarding the remedy on the following factors: (1) if the case 
were remanded, the state might be able to establish good cause 
because " [a] finding of good cause requires the trial court to 
balance the defendant's interest in cross-examining a witness 
against the State's need to use a particular hearsay statement" 
(S.B. at 6) and a co-conspirator's hearsay statement might be 
admissible in a probation revocation hearing if the state offered 
"'a reasonably satisfactory explanation' for not bringing [the 
co-conspirator] in as a witness" (S.B. at 6-7); (2) the state's 
erroneous claim that the evidence supporting the aggravated 
assault is not affected by the unreliability of a co-defendant's 
statement and "was based essentially on the officers' non-hearsay 
testimony regarding the nature of the victim's injuries and a 
photo line-up identification of defendant by the victim" (S.B. at 
7); (3) "[a] probation revocation may be based solely upon 
hearsay" (S.B. at 8); and (4) case law from other jurisdictions 
which the state claims supports a remand rather than vacation of 
the probation order (S.B. at 8-9). 
The rationale offered by the state for remanding the case 
for a finding of good cause is not compelling when scrutinized. 
Moreover, the remedy requested by the state is contrary to 
controlling case law. See e.g. Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 
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1294, 1300 (Utah App. 1990)(vacating order violating probation 
where revocation based on hearsay); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 
774, 788 (Utah 1991) (failure to make findings which were 
prerequisite to admission of evidence requires reversal of 
conviction). 
In Peronek, this Court held that the defendant's probation 
was revoked in violation of due process where the revocation was 
based solely on hearsay, the trial judge did not make a finding 
of good cause, and "nothing in the record suggests good cause for 
denying the defendant this fundamental right [of confrontation]." 
Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1299. This Court further held that the 
appropriate remedy where the probation violation was based on 
unreliable hearsay and the record failed to suggest good cause 
for depriving the defendant of his right to confrontation is to 
vacate the order revoking probation. Peronek, 803 P.2d at 13 00. 
The Peronek holding that the probation revocation order must be 
vacated where the revocation is based on hearsay and the record 
fails to suggest good cause for denying the right to 
confrontation resolves the issue as to remedy in this case. 
Additionally, case law from the Utah Supreme Court and this 
Court requires that an order be vacated where the trial judge 
failed to make findings which were a prerequisite to admission of 
evidence. See e.g. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788; State v. Nelson, 
950 P.2d 940, 944 (Utah App. 1997). In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme 
Court refused to remand the case for factual findings as to the 
admissibility of eyewitness identification testimony. Instead, 
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the Court stated: 
However, in the present case the failure to make 
findings is not a mere technical oversight that makes 
it difficult for us to adequately review the trial 
court's ruling. [citation omitted] Instead, we have a 
failure of the judge to address the factual questions 
and to make the legal determinations that were a 
prerequisite to the admission of the eyewitness 
identification essential to the conviction. To ask the 
trial court to address the admissibility question now 
would be to tempt it to reach a post hoc 
rationalization for the admission of this pivotal 
evidence. Such a mode of proceeding holds too much 
potential for abuse. The only fair way to proceed is 
to vacate defendant's conviction and remand the matter 
for retrial. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788; see also Nelson, 950 P.2d at 944 
(vacating conviction where trial judge failed to make findings or 
conclusions regarding admissibility of eyewitness identification 
testimony); see also State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 
1993)(vacating conviction where defendant never advised of 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation since trial 
judge "could not then or now assess [defendant's] responses to 
that advice"). 
Although the state ignores the remedies in Peronek, Ramirez, 
Bakalov, and Nelson, these cases nevertheless demonstrate that 
the order revoking probation should be vacated. As was the case 
in Ramirez, the trial judge in this case did not make findings 
which were a prerequisite to admission of the evidence. See 
Appellant's opening brief at 16-17, citing cases requiring a 
finding of good cause as a prerequisite for admission of hearsay. 
To ask the trial court to resolve the good cause issue at this 
juncture "would be to tempt it to reach a post hoc 
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rationalization for the admission of this pivotal evidence." 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 789. Such a mode of proceeding was rejected 
in Ramirez in the context of admission of eyewitness 
identification at trial. Although the instant case involves the 
admission of hearsay evidence in a probation violation hearing, 
the rationale nevertheless applies, and requires that this Court 
vacate the revocation order. 
Moreover, as the state concedes, nothing in the record 
supports a good cause determination. Hence, the remand requested 
by the state exceeds the remand rejected in Ramirez since the 
state is also seeking the ability to put on further evidence. 
Since the state failed to introduce evidence demonstrating that 
the good cause prerequisite was met, the probation order must be 
vacated. 
The state's apparent argument that it might be able to 
establish good cause because a good cause determination is based 
on a balancing of the defendant's right to cross-examination with 
the state's need for the hearsay (S.B. at 6) adds nothing to the 
analysis of whether the state ought to be given the opportunity 
at this late date to put on evidence regarding good cause. Nor 
does the state's claim that a co-conspirator's statements might 
come in at a probation violation hearing affect the issue of 
whether the state ought to be given a chance to show good cause 
at this juncture. Regardless of whether good cause for allowing 
a co-conspirator's hearsay statement might exist in some 
circumstances, in the present case, the state did not demonstrate 
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good cause for the admission of such statements. 
In addition, in cases where the admission of a co-
conspirator's statement has been upheld, the trial judge made a 
finding of reliability which was supported by the record. See 
e.g. United States v. Zentaraf, 20 F. 3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(cited in S.B. at 7). In the present case, no such finding was 
made and, as set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 19-35, the 
statements were not reliable. Moreover, courts which have 
admitted hearsay statements of co-conspirators have recognized 
that ordinarily such statements are not reliable. See id. at 
910. For example, in Zentgraf, the court relied on Bruton v. 
United States, 931 U.S. 123 (1968) and Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 
530 (1986) for the proposition that "[o]rdinarily, the 
reliability of an accomplice's confession implicating the accused 
is viewed with 'special suspicion.'" Zentgraf, 20 F. 3d at 910. 
The state's suggestion that the probation violation should 
be upheld because the finding that Tate committed an aggravated 
assault was not based on hearsay (S.B. at 7) is incorrect. 
Officer Kent testified regarding Josh Wagstaff's statements to 
her about Hanson's injuries as well as Hanson's statements to her 
about his injuries. R. 88:35-36. This testimony was hearsay 
which did not fit any exceptions. Indeed, the state has not 
claimed that the testimony fit any exceptions or otherwise 
briefed its rationale for the claim that Officer Kent's testimony 
regarding the statements of others which were offered for the 
6 
truth of the matter asserted was not hearsay.1 
Additionally, Officer Kent's testimony that Hanson selected 
Tate from a photo spread was hearsay. While Hanson could have 
testified to such a selection, Officer Kent's testimony was the 
statement of another, Hanson's selection of Appellant, which was 
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Again, the state 
merely makes a bald assertion that this was not hearsay, and 
makes no claim that the evidence fit within a hearsay exception. 
Moreover, the state later refers to the "hearsay witness 
identifications," thereby undercutting its claim that this 
testimony was not hearsay. See S.B. at 8. 
The state made no attempt to establish good cause for the 
use of the hearsay testimony that Hanson selected Appellant from 
a photo lineup. In addition, the hearsay was not reliable given 
the problems with eyewitness identification, the vagueness of 
Hanson's report, and the state's apparent inability to obtain 
Hanson as a witness. See Appellant's opening brief at 34. 
Officer Salazar testified regarding the injuries he saw when 
he arrived at the restaurant and located an injured man. 
R. 88:29. While this testimony was not hearsay, it also did not 
1
 The state does not cite to the portions of the record it 
relies on for its claim that the aggravated assault "was based 
essentially on the officers' non-hearsay testimony regarding the 
nature of the victim's injuries and a photo line-up identification 
of defendant by the victim." S.B. at 7. The state's bald 
assertion without reference to the hearsay rules or exceptions 
coupled with the lack of record cites fails to meet the briefing 
requirements of Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
This Court should decline to review this aspect of the state's 
argument. 
7 
implicate Tate or demonstrate that an assault rather than a fight 
occurred. This non-hearsay testimony established only that 
Hanson was injured and was not sufficient to sustain the finding 
that Tate committed an aggravated assault. 
The state also appears to argue that a remand rather than 
vacation of the revocation order is appropriate because " [a] 
probation revocation may be based solely upon hearsay." S.B. 
at 8. While the state is correct that some courts have held that 
probation may be revoked based solely on reliable hearsay (see 
State v. Miller, 888 P.2d 399 (Kan. App. 1995), cited in S.B. at 
8), other courts have held otherwise. See Miller, 888 P.2d at 
406-07, citing cases that have held that probation violation 
cannot be based solely on reliable hearsay; see also cases cited 
in Appellant's opening brief at 20. Regardless of whether a 
probation violation can be based solely on reliable hearsay, in 
this case, the hearsay was not reliable and not properly admitted 
as set forth in Appellant's opening brief at 14-35. 
Finally, the state relies on decisions from other states 
remanding for further proceedings rather than revoking probation. 
As previously outlined, Peronek and Ramirez, case law from Utah 
appellate courts, control this issue. Additionally, Zentgraf is 
distinguishable because there was other evidence which by itself 
would have been legally sufficient for the trial court to revoke 
Zentgraf's probation. Zentgraf, 20 F. 3d at 910. Because it was 
undisputed in Zentgraf that the defendant violated probation by 
associating with a convicted felon, there was sufficient evidence 
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for a probation violation without the hearsay. A question 
remained, however, as to whether the trial court would have found 
that Zentgraf committed a burglary without the hearsay or how the 
trial court would have disposed of the violation if association 
were the only violation. Remand for further proceedings was 
therefore appropriate. The rationale in Zentgraf does not 
therefore apply to this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's rights to due process and confrontation were 
violated when the trial court revoked his probation based on 
hearsay and multiple hearsay where the trial court did not make a 
preliminary finding that good cause existed for the use of 
hearsay, the record does not demonstrate good cause, and the 
hearsay evidence was not reliable. The proper remedy for such 
violation is vacation of the order revoking probation^ 
SUBMITTED this 22**- day of August, 1999. 
Ck*. (. a)Hf 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
STEPHANIE AMES 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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